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Non-Technical Summary
Multinational companies have enhanced tax planning opportunities by means of cross-
border profit shifting. In particular, it is supposed that transfer pricing of intrafirm trade
constitutes an important channel for companies to shift taxable profits between jurisdic-
tions. While taxable profits of affiliated companies are determined by separate accounting,
it is often impossible to determine a true intrafirm transfer price since economies of in-
tegration are special characteristics of affiliated companies. Therefore, it is reasonable
that multinationals have a range of opportunities to set tax-optimal transfer-prices, even
though transfer prices are audited according to the arm’s length principle. This would
imply internal management distortions for companies and tax revenue consequences for
countries.
This paper investigates whether transfer pricing of intrafirm sales within multinationals
represents an important channel of company tax planning. A simple theoretical model,
considering transfer pricing of intrafirm sales of a multinational company, is used to obtain
empirical implications. The theoretical analysis suggests a negative effect of the local tax
rate on transfer prices and the size of intrafirm sales.
The empirical analysis considers directly the supposed tax response of balance sheet items
reflecting intrafirm sales. Micro-level panel data of German affiliates in 31 countries during
the period from 1996 until 2003 are employed, which are taken from the MiDi database
provided by the Deutsche Bundesbank. The empirical results show that the size of balance
sheet items, which reflect intrafirm sales, decrease with an increasing local tax rate. Thus,
it can be confirmed that profit shifting by means of transfer pricing of intrafirm sales
works effectively. The magnitude of estimated tax responses suggests that transfer pricing
constitutes an important channel of tax planning despite anti-avoidance legislations and
tax audits based on the arm’s length principle.
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1 Introduction
International differences in company taxation not only affect companies’ real investment
decisions, but also the tax design of investments. It is often assumed that profit shifting
via transfer pricing of intrafirm trading constitutes an important way for companies to
design tax-optimal real investments. A basic principle in taxation of affiliated companies
located in different countries is to determine their taxable profits by separate account-
ing. Transfer pricing of company-internal trade is usually controlled by the ‘arm’s length
principle’. However, since economies of integration are special characteristics of affiliated
companies, it is often impossible to calculate a true intrafirm transfer price. Hence, multi-
nationals should have a range of opportunities to set tax-optimal transfer prices. This
would imply distortions of companies’ internal management decisions based on transfer
prices. Moreover, this would also have tax revenue consequences for countries.
While extended surveys on empirical evidence of companies’ behavioral response to taxa-
tion are provided e.g. by Hines (1999) and Devereux (2006), let us briefly look at previous
studies, which in particular analyse empirically tax planning via transfer pricing. Empir-
ical investigations often attempt to confirm indirectly that profit shifting with regard to
transfer pricing works effectively. Typically, reported profits are used as the dependent
variable. Grubert and Mutti (1991) as well as Hines and Rice (1994), for example, find
a negative relationship between reported profits and the local tax level of US outbound
FDI. These results are confirmed by Huizinga and Laeven (2005) for European companies
and by Weichenrieder (2006) for German FDI data. Although some studies such as Jacob
(1996) considers intrafirm sales as an explaining variable, these results can be taken only
as indirect hints that taxable profits are effectively shifted, e.g. by transfer pricing.
However, a more precise identification of transfer pricing as a specific profit shifting channel
is feasible by focusing directly on intrafirm deliveries. Then, problematic aspects of indirect
1
investigation approaches, which may arise, for example, from competing profit shifting
activities such as financing, can be avoided. Up to now only a few studies, which are
mostly based on US data, focus directly on data of goods traded. Swenson (2001) finds a
small tax response of transfer prices by using product-level trade price data of US imports.
Similarly, Clausing (2003) finds, based on product-level price data, that prices of intrafirm
trade respond to tax levels, whereas prices of open-market operations are not affected by
different tax levels. Furthermore, a few studies use company data of intrafirm transactions.
By using aggregated firm data, Clausing (2001, 2006) confirms an impact of taxes on
intrafirm trade flows between US firms and their affiliates. Grubert (2003) shows, based
on a cross-section analysis of US Treasury data, that the ratio of intrafirm transactions to
total sales of US controlled foreign companies is influenced by taxes.
This paper aims to provide additional insights into the tax response of intrafirm sales.
The empirical approach focuses directly on balance sheet items reflecting intrafirm sales.
The analysis is based on the MiDi database, a comprehensive micro-level panel database
of virtually all German multinationals, made available for research by the Deutsche Bun-
desbank. Under German tax law repatriated profits are almost completely tax exempt.
Thus, taxation of the foreign affiliate is decisive for profit shifting. In fact, a significant
impact of tax rates on multinational profit shifting activities, by means of intrafirm sales, is
confirmed by the following analysis. It can be shown that the size of balance sheet items,
which reflect intrafirm sales, decreases with an increasing local tax rate. These results
suggest that transfer pricing represents a relevant channel of tax planning.
The paper is structured as follows; in section 2, a theoretical model considers profit shifting
decisions of a multinational corporation, from which empirical implications are derived. In
sections 3 and 4, a description of the empirical investigation approach follows as well as a
presentation of the data used. Thereafter, in section 5, the implication that intrafirm sales
are responsive to tax rates is tested empirically. Finally, section 6 concludes.
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2 The Model
The impact of transfer prices on after-tax profits can be described by a simple company
model with only two locations, where the parent company is denoted by 1 and the controlled
affiliate by 2. The company’s profits are determined by output
f (k1) + f (k2) ,
whereas k1, k2 are investments at the two locations. Opportunity costs of capital are
r (k1 + k2) .
Furthermore, the company trades one product between its affiliates. Extending a model
used in Haufler and Schjelderup (2000), it is considered that intrafirm sales are related
to the amount of invested capital. Moreover, the company can also choose the quantity
of intrafirm deliveries per invested capital. The quantity of intrafirm sales per invested
capital, kj, is denoted by xj. Thus, the quantity x1 per invested capital k1 is supplied to
the affiliate by the parent company 1, and x2 per invested capital k2 is supplied to the
parent company by the affiliate 2, respectively.
However, optimal economic levels of intrafirm trade, denoted by xj, are considered by
the production functions. Furthermore, as transfer prices are used as an instrument of
a non-central coordination and incentive system between affiliates (e.g. Hirshleifer, 1957;
Schjelderup and Sørgard, 1997; Baldenius et al., 2004), the prices of the internally delivered
goods, which are optimal for decentral coordination before taxes, are assumed as pj.
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With regard to the apportionment of the company’s output before taxes, these optimal
coordination prices are assumed. Regularly these prices are unobservable for tax authorities
1In principle, in the case of an integrated production, calculating an economically ‘true’ arm’s length
price must fail. Nevertheless, internal price setting is used as a non-central coordination system.
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and are approximated by an arm’s length price. However, if profits are taxed, the actual
settlement prices of company-internal trading might be different and are denoted by p1, p2.
2
Apart from taxes and transaction costs, the total company profit is not affected by the
amount of intrafirm sales per invested capital, pjxj. However, for tax purposes company-
internal trade has to be settled in separate accounts according to the arm’s length principle.
Then, the following deviation from profits before taxes can be obtained,
(t2 − t1)(p1 − p1)x1k1 + (t1 − t2)(p2 − p2)x2k2,
where the statutory tax rate at the location of the parent is denoted by t1 and at the affil-
iate’s location by t2.
3 Obviously, a tax rate difference between both locations indicates an
incentive to optimise intrafirm sales. As the price pj is typically not visible to tax authori-
ties, the settlement of the actual price pj constitutes a degree of freedom for multinationals.
Nevertheless, it is reasonable that the probability of punishment, tax advisory costs and
economic inefficiencies rise at an increasing deviation from pj. Especially the economic
inefficiencies seem to be very important, since transfer prices and intrafirm markets are
typically used as instruments of a non-central coordination and incentive system. These
costs are considered by a cost function, denoted by cj(pj). A deviation above or below
the optimal coordination price before taxes, pj, raises these costs. Hence, the following
properties are assumed
cj(pj) = cj,p(pj) = 0, sign[cj,p(pj)] = sign[pj − pj], d
2cj
dp2j
> 0.
Finally, a multinational company can boost a profit shift by increasing the quantity of
company-internal trade per invested capital, xj. However, a deviation from the optimal
2Prices differ from the optimal coordination price when companies use only one set of books for both
tax and management purposes. An international study provided by Ernst & Young (2001), for example,
reports that 77 percent of 638 multinationals use the same transfer price for both purposes.
3Statutory tax rates are the relevant tax measures, since different determination of the tax base such
as a depreciation method has no effect on shifted profits.
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economical level of company-internal trading per invested capital, apart from tax effects,
will cause additional costs of company-internal trade, e.g. production inefficiencies or inef-
ficiencies caused by a crowding out of open market input by intrafirm products (Grubert,
2003). Hence, the following properties of these additional costs, ej(xj), are assumed
ej(xj) = ej,x(xj) = 0, sign[ej,x(xj)] = sign[xj − xj], d
2ej
dx2j
> 0.
Together, the following profit function can be obtained
pi = f (k1) (1− t1) + f (k2) (1− t2)− r(k1 + k2)
+ [(t2 − t1)(p1 − p1)x1 − c1(p1)x1 − e1(x1)]k1
+ [(t1 − t2)(p2 − p2)x2 − c2(p2)x2 − e2(x2)]k2. (1)
Obviously, company-internal trading effects direct profit shifting from the receiving affiliate
to the supplying affiliate or vice versa.4 Therefore, it can be expected that intrafirm sales,
pjxj, are responsive to bilateral tax rate differences. Thus, for setting the optimum price,
say by the controlled affiliate 2, the following first-order condition can be obtained,
(t1 − t2) != c2,p(p2). (2)
Additionally, for the optimum quantity of company-internal trade of affiliate 2, we obtain
(t1 − t2)(p2 − p2)− c2(p2) != e2,x(x2). (3)
Considering the characteristics of both cost functions, the optimal price settled, p2, in-
creases with an increasing tax rate difference, (t1 − t2). For instance, if the tax rate
difference (t1 − t2) is positive, the actual price p2 should settle above p2. This effect can
be extended by increasing quantities of company-internal trade in the case of a positive
4The model specification assumes an exemption system for the repatriation of foreign dividends, i.e.
the tax level of the affiliate is final. This is correct considering German outbound FDI data which are used
for the following empirical analysis. Germany taxes only 5% of repatriated profits.
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as well as a negative tax rate difference. The following comparative static analysis makes
these points clearer. The comparative static properties are derived by differentiating the
first-order conditions. Then, we get
dt1 − dt2 = c2,pp(p2)dp2, (4)
(p2 − p2)(dt1 − dt2) + [(t1 − t2)− c2,p(p2)]dp2 = e2,xx(x2)dx2. (5)
In equation (5) the term [(t1− t2)− c2,p(p2)] is zero, when the price is tax-optimally settled
and condition (2) is considered.5 Then, the marginal effects of increasing tax rates on the
optimal transfer price settled by affiliate 2 are
dp2
dt2
= − 1
c2,pp(p2)
= −dp2
dt1
. (6)
Equation (6) shows that the optimal transfer price of deliveries to the parent 1 carried out
by affiliate 2 decreases with an increasing tax rate of the affiliate 2. Equation (6) also shows
the opposite effect of an increasing tax rate of the parent 1. The optimal transfer price
of the affiliate’s deliveries increases with an increasing tax rate at the parent’s location.
Thus, the optimal transfer price increases with an increasing tax rate difference (t1 − t2).
With regard to the marginal effects of increasing tax rates on the optimal trading quantity
supplied by the affiliate 2, we obtain
dx2
dt2
= − p2 − p2
e2,xx(x2)
= −dx2
dt1
. (7)
With regard to (7), two cases must be distinguished. First, the effect of an increasing
tax rate, t2, at the affiliate’s location on x2 is negative if (p2 − p2) > 0, which requires
that (t1 − t2) > 0. Simultaneously, the effect of an increasing tax rate, t1, at the parent
company is positive. Thus, if the tax rate difference (t1 − t2) is positive, the optimal
5However, it can be shown that the comparative static effects also hold in more general cases.
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quantities supplied to the parent company 1, by affiliate 2, decreases with higher tax rates
at the affiliate’s location, and increases with higher tax rates at the parent’s location.
On the other hand, if the tax rate of the parent is lower than the affiliate’s tax rate, i.e.
(t1 − t2) < 0, the effects are vice versa. This means that the quantities supplied to the
parent company decrease with a higher tax rate of the parent company and increase with
a higher tax rate of the affiliate. The intuition is that the optimal quantity of company-
internal trading always increases if the tax rate difference in absolute values increases.
The total effect on intrafirm sales per invested capital, pjxj, which consists of a quantity
effect and a price effect, is only unambiguous if the tax rate of the receiving company
is the higher rate of the two. Otherwise, the total effect might be ambiguous since the
situation offers an incentive to not only underprice intrafirm trade, but also to boost
quantities. Although it is reasonable that tax authorities can better control transfer prices
than the choice of internally delivered quantities (Grubert, 2003), there are some good
reasons for pricing dominance in practice. First, increasing quantities is then, and only
then, useful if underpricing already exists. Secondly, every underpricing constitutes a basic
effect on all company-internal trading, which would be carried out despite any additional
intrafirm deliveries due to tax planning. These basic intrafirm deliveries are also affected
by tax optimal price setting. Finally, pricing might often be easier than changing trade
quantities. Particularly when intermediate goods are traded, the quantities are determined
by the company’s production structure and should be fairly fixed.
Overall, expecting a positive response of intrafirm sales on increasing tax rate differences
seems to be reasonable. However, the expected response might be biased to a certain
extent, due to increasing quantities, in cases where the tax rate of the receiving company
is below the supplier’s tax rate. If the opposite effect of extended quantities is dominated
by the pricing effect, an increasing tax rate at the supplying affiliate’s location should
lead to decreasing intrafirm sales as well. Therefore, in accordance with equation (6) the
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following proposition can be empirically tested:
Proposition: If transfer prices are tax driven, intrafirm sales will decrease with an increas-
ing statutory tax rate at the supplying affiliate’s location and increase with an increasing
statutory tax rate at the receiving affiliate’s location.
3 Investigation Approach
The proposition presented above provides a testable relationship between intrafirm sales
and tax rates. It can be tested empirically using firm-level financial statements of German
outbound FDI. For the empirical analysis, the MiDi database for multinationals, provided
by the Deutsche Bundesbank, is used. This database contains financial statements of
German FDI as well as additional information about the parent company.
Similar to Clausing (2001, 2006) and Grubert (2003), the focus is on variables reflecting
intrafirm trade. The data-set used for the empirical analysis does not contain complete
information on intrafirm sales of German foreign affiliates. However, due to the fact that
transactions are entered in financial accounting on the delivery date and not on the payment
date, the balance sheet items ‘accounts receivable from affiliated companies ’ denoted by
ARA as well as ‘accounts receivable from parent company ’ denoted by ARP can be used
instead. These items are available in the data-base. They reflect the shares of intrafirm
sales carried out with other affiliates and the parent company, respectively, which are
unpaid at the balance sheet date.6 Thus, these balance sheet items represent a snapshot of
the annual internal turnover, i.e. the unpaid share of intrafirm sales at the balance sheet
6Let us consider, for example, intrafirm deliveries of intermediate goods priced at e100 to the parent
company, by affiliate 2, in November 2002, while the payment date by the parent company was in February
2003. Then, these intrafirm sales constitute ‘accounts receivable from parent company’ of e100 at the
balance sheet date December, 31st, 2002.
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date. The relationship between intrafirm sales and its unpaid share at the balance sheet
date depends on local costs of refinancing outstanding bills as well as on firm specifics
such as a specific cash management system. A country specific lending rate constitutes a
good proxy for local refinancing costs, whereas company specifics can be controlled by a
company fixed effect. However, it should be emphasized that the payment date of accounts
receivable is irrelevant for tax purposes, as profits or losses are entered on the delivery date
and not on the payment date.7
A first set of estimations can be carried out, considering ‘accounts receivable from affiliated
companies’, ARA, by means of the following equation
ln(ARAj,k,l,t) = α0+α1STRj,t+α2ln(CAPITALj,t) + α3ln(LENDINGRATEj,t)
+ αk + αl + αt + j,k,l,t, (8)
where j denotes the affiliate, k the parent and αt a time specific effect. The statutory tax
rate of the affiliate is denoted by STRj,t. However, the size of intrafirm sales also depends
on real economic factors, since it is based on delivered goods and services. Therefore, a
company effect αk and an industry effect αl are considered to control for unobservable
heterogeneity between different company groups and industries. Moreover, in accordance
with the theoretical model, the size of the affiliate’s business activity is controlled for by
introducing the affiliate’s total invested capital, denoted by CAPITAL. However, the affili-
ate’s total capital may be endogenous, since the analysed profit shifting opportunities may
affect the size of the affiliate’s business activity. For this reason, instrument variable (IV)
estimations are carried out. At the first stage ln(CAPITAL) is regressed on all exogenous
variables and the natural log of the affiliate country’s GDP. Typically, GDP indicates the
size of the local market. Hence, the correlation between invested capital and GDP orig-
7A company may use the implicit interest-free credit of accounts receivable for tax planning by increasing
payment periods with an increasing tax rate (Bernard and Weiner, 1990). Then, the expected adverse
effect of higher local taxes on ‘accounts receivables from affiliated companies’ due to tax-optimal transfer
pricing will be underestimated to some extent.
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inates from sales opportunities to third parties. On the other hand, intrafirm deliveries
should not be affected by the local market size, in which the affiliate is located. Thus, the
natural log of GDP of the affiliate’s country constitutes a suitable instrument.
In a second set of regressions, the subitem ‘accounts receivable from the parent company’
is considered in order to analyse transfer pricing of intrafirm sales carried out with the own
parent company. Then, the specific bilateral tax rate differences are observable. Moreover,
information about the bilateral distance between the affiliate’s country and the parent’s
country, i.e. Germany, are available. Hence, the following estimation equation is used
ln(ARPj,k,l,t) = β0+β1(STRk,t−STRj,t)+β2ln(CAPITALj,t)+β3ln(LENDINGRATEj,t)
+ β4ln(DISTANCEj,k) + βk + βl + βt + j,k,l,t. (9)
Since ln(CAPITAL) may be endogenous, IV estimations are carried out, where ln(GDP)
is used as an instrument variable. With regard to the tax effects, a negative sign of α1 and
a positive sign of β1 is expected according to our proposition.
4 Data and Descriptive Statistics
The empirical analysis uses theMiDi database for multinationals provided by the Deutsche
Bundesbank. This is a comprehensive annual micro database of direct investment positions
of German enterprises held abroad as well as direct investment positions held in Germany
by foreign companies. However, this analysis is based only on data of German outbound
FDI positions. The data provides annual information about the balance sheet of each
investment object, including further information on the type of investment and on the
investor.8 A favourable characteristic of the data set is the opportunity to trace direct
8See Lipponer (2006) for a detailed description of the data set.
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Table 1: German controlled outbound FDI 1996 - 2003
Destination Number CAPITAL Accounts Number CAPITAL Accounts
(Mean, Receivable (Mean, Receivable
e1,000) from Affiliates e1,000) from Parent
(Mean, e1,000) (Mean, e1,000)
Australia 587 22,443 3,228 233 28,759 1,411
Austria 1,996 37,178 8,674 716 43,327 4,487
Belgium 1,198 59,721 13,280 487 40,154 3,447
Canada 411 44,640 4,370 130 70,763 1,690
Czech Republic 1,320 35,467 2,123 554 47,625 1,303
Denmark 575 24,525 2,274 237 28,889 1,581
Estonia -∗ - - -∗ - -
Finland 212 22,488 4,044 92 28,088 3,122
France 3,125 37,156 5,462 1,434 37,466 3,068
Great Britain 2,057 39,893 6,399 902 36,155 2,615
Greece 233 34,062 1,805 124 31,596 1,010
Hungary 878 45,186 7,093 319 58,018 10,598
Ireland 257 23,300 5,197 101 24,098 2,480
Italy 2,266 41,000 4,103 960 43,350 2,081
Japan 657 67,921 6,893 332 92,900 3,210
Latvia 23 11,623 477 12 15,625 528
Lithuania 28 8,229 2,358 -∗ - -
Luxembourg 40 25,282 4,072 16 31,716 3,236
Malta -∗ - - -∗ - -
Mexico 397 98,198 10,612 141 51,462 1,718
Netherlands 1,482 40,071 13,811 554 32,339 3,744
New Zealand 97 10,324 675 44 12,593 1,041
Norway 229 37,522 4,328 92 40,749 4,536
Poland 1,261 24,549 1,863 400 29,390 1,296
Portugal 237 32,312 6,712 117 45,703 6,234
Slovakia 290 31,968 2,075 94 44,237 3,607
Slovenia 129 18,306 3,169 61 15,798 1,626
Spain 1,966 43,902 5,398 794 41,308 2,346
Sweden 715 27,378 5,408 282 32,179 2,162
Switzerland 1,990 24,032 4,796 901 25,310 2,938
USA 2,117 96,135 13,611 851 84,208 3,512
Total 26,786 42,908 6,635 10,991 43,198 3,009
∗ Not reported because of data protection since the number of observations is below 10.
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investment positions of individual firms over time. The panel data structure and the
ability to identify all foreign affiliates belonging to a specific multinational company make
it possible to control for heterogeneity across companies. The collection of the data is
enforced by German law, which determines reporting mandates for certain international
transactions and positions.9 The version used provides firm-level panel data for the period
of 1996 to 2003. Since the model deals with an enterprise optimising intrafirm sales between
each affiliate, only observations displaying a participation level above 50 per cent are taken
into account. The reported figures are based on a sample of firm observations which display
positive real capital and turnover for every reported year. Furthermore, due to the fact
that the underlying model deals with a simple two-tier company structure of a firm which
actually produces at home and abroad, indirectly held investments as well as holdings and
financial service providers are excluded.10 Table 1 presents the spatial apportionment of
the considered German FDI from 1996 until 2003.
According to equations (8) and (9), the natural log of firm-level ‘accounts receivable from
affiliates’ as well as ‘accounts receivable from the parent company’ are kept as dependent
variables. Moreover, total capital (CAPITAL) and total turnover (TURNOVER) of each
affiliate are taken from the MiDi database. As unpaid dividends and interest of financial
assets may cause higher accounts receivable, a dummy variable DFIN is used. This DFIN
represents financial interests in affiliated companies, having the value one, while otherwise
zero. It is reasonable to assume that the opportunity to plan tax-optimal intrafirm sales
is higher if an affiliate is wholly owned compared to quoted share holdings (Kant, 1990).
Therefore, a dummy variable DWO is used, which has the value one if the affiliate is wholly
9Sec. 26 Aussenwirtschaftsgesetz (Law on Foreign Trade and Payments) in connection with Aussen-
wirtschaftsverordnung (Foreign Trade and Payment Regulations). Each German multinational has to
report its foreign assets including both direct FDI and indirect FDI conditional on some lower threshold
level for mandatory reporting. Since 2002, FDI has to be reported, if the participation is 10% or more and
the balance sheet total of the foreign object is above 3 million Euro. Though previous years showed lower
threshold levels, this threshold level is uniformly applied for all years in the panel.
10Surprisingly at first sight, a neighbouring country like Luxembourg captures only a small share of
German FDI observations. Given the fact that companies are excluded which likely do not produce goods,
i.e. holdings or financial service providers, this is very reasonable.
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Definition Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max.
Firm level variables
ARA accounts receivable from 6,635 80,970 1 6,289,124
affiliates in e thousand
ARP a) accounts receivable from parent 3,009 19,144 1 1,016,158
company in e thousand
CAPITAL total assets in e thousand 42,908 298,621 3,000 35,600,000
TURNOVER turnover in e thousand 67,014 450,047 1,000 51,900,000
DFIN binary .283 .451 0 1
DLCF binary .276 .447 0 1
DWO binary .831 .375 0 1
Tax variables
STRGEa) German stat. tax rate .418 .020 .392 .439
STRF foreign stat. tax rate .346 .070 .0 .532
STRGE-STRF a) tax rate difference .072 .069 -.094 .435
Further characteristics
LENDING RATE local lending rate .073 .042 .018 .364
DISTANCEa) flight distance in km 1,978 3,294 190 18,162
GDP in billion US dollars 1,424 2,438 7.2 10,600
26,786 observations. a): 10,991 observation.
owned, and zero if not.
The variable STRGE contains German statutory profit tax rates.
11 Foreign statutory tax
rates are kept by the variable STRF . While using these two statutory tax rates, bilateral
tax rate differences are constructed. The statutory tax rate is the relevant tax measure if
an affiliate does not exhibit any loss carry forward or any current losses. For this reason
the dummy variable DLCF is used as an indicator for the possibility to offset former losses
with actual profits for tax purposes taking on the value one, while otherwise zero.
11An average level of the local German trade income tax (Gewerbesteuer) is considered.
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The country specific lending rate (LENDING RATE) is used as an appropriate proxy of
refinancing costs in order to control impacts of different payment policies. Additionally,
a variable DISTANCE is used, containing the average flight distance between Germany
and the affiliate’s country. Finally, the affiliate’s country GDP is used. Table 2 presents
descriptive statistics of the data used for the samples. Included are 26,786 German out-
bound observations exhibiting ’accounts receivable from affiliated companies’ and 10,991
observations exhibiting ’accounts receivable from parent company’, which are located in
31 countries during the period from 1996 until 2003.
5 Regression Results
The tax impact on intrafirm sales is analysed using German outbound FDI data. Empirical
analysis is based on the estimation equations (8) and (9). First, the natural log of ‘accounts
receivable from affiliated companies’ is used as a dependent variable. Further analyses are
focused on the subitem ‘accounts receivable from parent company’ in order to provide
additional insights.
A first set of results is presented in table 3, where the natural log of ‘accounts receivable
from affiliated companies ’ is used as the dependent variable. According to the theoretical
model, all specifications presented in table 3 indicate a significant negative impact of a
higher tax rate at the affiliate’s location on ‘accounts receivable from affiliates’. This result
can be interpreted as a negative impact of a higher tax rate on intrafirm sales since the
item ‘accounts receivable from affiliates’ constitutes a snapshot of annual intrafirm sales.
Since different local lending rates reflect different incentives to pay internal bills, a negative
effect of a higher local lending rate on unpaid accounts receivable, at the balance sheet
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Table 3: Transfer Pricing of Intrafirm Sales
Dependent Variable Natural log of accounts receivable from affiliates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
STRF -1.45∗∗ -2.14∗∗ -2.02∗∗ -2.41∗∗ -3.38∗∗
(.513) (.487) (.543) (.709) (.693)
ln(CAPITAL) .509∗∗ .489∗∗ .549∗∗ .501∗∗ .512∗∗
(.124) (.117) (.117) (.122) (.110)
ln(LENDING RATE) -.669∗∗ -.606∗∗ -.637∗∗ -.674∗∗ -.583∗∗
(.089) (.078) (.086) (.089) (.076)
STRFxDFIN 1.93∗∗ 2.05∗∗
(.464) (.475)
DFIN .241 .177
(.167) (.171)
STRFxDLCF 2.10∗∗ 2.17∗∗
(.507) (.494)
DLCF -.957∗∗ -.948∗∗
(.176) (.171)
STRFxDWO 1.21∗ .846
(.592) (.561)
DWO -.348 -.184
(.224) (.213)
R2 .095 .144 .099 .095 .148
All regressions are IV estimations. At the first stage ln(CAPITAL) is regressed on all exogenous
variables and ln(GDP). Only second stage regression results are presented. F-tests of the sig-
nificance of the first stage specifications are all significant at 1% level. Standard errors are in
parentheses, which are clustered within 224 year-country cells and robust against random firm-
specific and country effects using the Huber-White sandwich formula. A star denotes significance
at the 5% level and two stars at the 1% level. All estimates include a full set of 2,565 firm, 46
industry and time fixed effects. There are 26,786 observations.
date, confirms the theoretical expectations. The higher local costs of refinancing are, the
faster accounts receivable are paid by an affiliated company. However, since intrafirm sales
are based on delivered goods and services, the amount of internal turnover depends on
real economic issues. For this reason, unobservable heterogeneity of the company group is
controlled for by firm and industry fixed effects. Finally, in accordance with our assumption
that the size of intrafirm sales is related to the size of invested capital, the natural log of
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invested capital is considered. It is confirmed that business activity exhibiting higher total
capital is associated with higher intrafirm sales.
The specifications (2)-(5) of table 3 provide deeper insights into the tax effects on in-
trafirm sales. First, companies that hold shares of affiliates or give loans to them might
have higher ‘accounts receivable from affiliates’ at the balance sheet date, resulting from
unpaid dividends or interest. Therefore, the regressions presented in columns (2) and (5)
of table 3 are carried out, including a dummy variable DFIN as well as an interaction of
this dummy with the tax rate difference. Affiliates, which have financial interests in affil-
iated companies such as shareholding or giving credit, exhibit less tax sensitivity of their
‘accounts receivable from affiliates’.12 Secondly, a dummy DLCF is introduced that indi-
cates if affiliates carry forward losses. Then the effective tax burden of marginal additional
profit amounts to zero, i.e. these cases shape a suitable control group. This expectation
is confirmed by specifications (3) and (5), which indicate significantly less tax sensitivity
of ‘accounts receivable from affiliates’ in cases where an affiliate exhibits a loss carryfor-
ward. These results are in line with MacKie-Mason (1990), who finds significantly less
tax planning sensitivity of US firms by means of financing in the case of companies suf-
fering losses. Thirdly, a dummy variable DWO is introduced indicating affiliates that are
wholly owned by a German parent company. With additional minority shareholders, tax
planning, by means of company-internal profit shifting, is limited by a conflict of interest
with outside shareholders. Thus, it might be reasonable to assume that profit shifting
works better, if an affiliate is wholly owned by one parent company. Moreover, in ac-
cordance with Kant (1990) it can be expected that affiliates, which are not wholly-owned,
exhibit higher intrafirm sales, since dominant shareholders have an incentive to shift profits
into its wholly-owned affiliates. However, both expectations cannot be confirmed by our
regressions considering ‘accounts receivable from affiliates’.
12In particular, inter-corporate dividends are often tax exempt.
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The semi-elasticities indicated by the tax coefficients is interpreted as follows: Specification
(5), presented in table 3, indicates a 3.38 per cent smaller ‘accounts receivable from affiliated
companies’ in the case of affiliates without a loss carryforward and financial interests in
affiliated companies, if the tax rate is increased by one percentage point. In the case of
affiliates that exhibit a loss carryforward, the total effect of one percentage point higher
tax rates on ‘accounts receivable from affiliates’ comes down to 1.2 per cent. An additional
set of results presented in table 5 in the appendix shows that the results are also very
robust if the affiliate’s total turnover is used as an alternative measure for the size of the
business activity.
Furthermore, the tax impact on intrafirm sales can be analysed considering only ’accounts
receivable from German parent company ’ as the dependent variable. In contrast to the
former set of analyses, a bilateral tax rate difference can be considered. The IV regression
results presented in table 4 are based on equation (9). According to the theoretical model,
the basic specification presented in column (1) of table 4 indicates a significantly positive
impact of a higher tax rate difference between Germany and the affiliate’s location on
‘accounts receivable from parent company’. Since accounts receivable due from intrafirm
deliveries constitute a snapshot of the annual intrafirm sales, this result also indicates a
significant impact of the tax rate difference on intrafirm sales.
Considering the control variables used in these regressions, the results match theoretical
expectations. The negative effect of a higher local lending rate on unpaid accounts receiv-
able, at the balance sheet date, confirms the theoretical expectations of payment policy.
Business activities exhibiting higher total capital are associated with higher intrafirm sales.
Additionally, since only one bilateral supply chain is considered, the distance of deliveries
is observable. Therefore, the flight distance between Germany and the affiliate’s location
is introduced in order to control for an additional aspect determining intrafirm deliveries
of goods and services. Theoretical expectations are confirmed by a significantly negative
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effect of a higher distance on affiliate’s ‘accounts receivable from parent company’.
Table 4: Transfer Pricing of Intrafirm Sales with Parent Company
Dependent Variable Natural log of accounts receivable from German parent
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
STRGE-STRF 1.70∗∗ 1.56∗∗ 2.41∗∗ -.373 .121
(.614) (.590) (.657) (1.13) (1.07)
ln(CAPITAL) .844∗∗ .844∗∗ .873∗∗ .832∗∗ .863∗∗
(.137) (.145) (.131) (.136) (.139)
ln(LENDING RATE) -.410∗∗ -.408∗∗ -.380∗∗ -.400∗∗ -.368∗∗
(.088) (.085) (.085) (.088) (.082)
ln(DISTANCE) -.219∗∗ -.219∗∗ -.214∗∗ -.218∗∗ -.213∗∗
(.029) (.030) (.028) (.029) (.029)
(STRGE-STRF )xDFIN .503 .351
(.771) (.761)
DFIN -.023 -.038
(.127) (.123)
(STRGE-STRF )xDLCF -2.73∗∗ -2.76∗∗
(.705) (.725)
DLCF .014 -.019
(.077) (.077)
(STRGE-STRF )xDWO 2.24∗ 2.37∗
(1.11) (1.09)
DWO .034 .035
(.103) (.102)
R2 .081 .090 .087 .082 .095
All regressions are IV estimations. At the first stage ln(CAPITAL) is regressed on all exogenous
variables and ln(GDP). Only second stage regression results are presented. F-tests of the sig-
nificance of the first stage specifications are all significant at 1% level. Standard errors are in
parentheses, which are clustered within 222 year-country cells and robust against random firm-
specific and country effects using the Huber-White sandwich formula. A star denotes significance
at the 5% level and two stars at the 1% level. All estimates include a full set of 1,383 firm, 46
industry and time fixed effects. There are 10,991 observations.
Similar to the first set of results presented in table 3, additional specifications (2)-(5) are
presented in table 4, which can provide deeper insights into tax effects on intrafirm sales
carried out with the parent company. The dummy variables, which indicate financial in-
terests in affiliated companies, a loss carryforward, as well as complete ownership by a
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German parent, are the same as used in the former set of regressions presented in table
3. In contrast to the former results, a different tax sensitivity with respect to ‘accounts
receivable from parent company’ cannot be confirmed by columns (2) and (5) in cases in
which affiliates have financial interests in affiliated companies. This suggests that in prac-
tice having financial interests within the parent company might be less relevant compared
to financial interests in other affiliated companies. With regard to exhibiting a loss carry-
forward, the estimations in columns (3) and (5) of table 4 confirm that an affiliate, which
can offset actual profits with former losses, has an opposite tax incentive to manipulate
intrafirm sales. Furthermore, the results in columns (4) and (5) confirm that profit shifting
works better if an affiliate is wholly owned by one parent. The positive impact of the inter-
action between the tax rate difference and the dummy indicating wholly-owned affiliates
is significant, whereas the tax effect considering all affiliates becomes insignificant. This
result is in line with Desai, Foley and Hines (2004), who find that wholly-owned affiliates
are more responsive to tax planning incentives.
The semi-elasticity indicated by the tax rate difference can be interpreted as follows: Spec-
ification (5) presented in table 4 indicates a 2.37 per cent higher ‘accounts receivable from
parent company’ of wholly owned affiliates without exhibiting any loss carryforward, if
the tax rate difference is increased by one percentage point. The results are very robust
considering alternative specifications presented in table 6 in the appendix. In compari-
son to the semi-elasticities, estimated using the item ’accounts receivable from affiliated
companies’, the tax response is also very similar. Moreover, in comparison to results of
previous studies based on US data, the magnitudes of our estimated tax response are quite
similar. For example, Clausing (2006) reports a tax response of the intrafirm trade balance
of approximately - 1.3 with regard to an one percentage point higher tax rate. A similar
specification, presented in column (1) of table 3, indicates a similar tax semi-elasticity of
intrafirm sales of about - 1.45. However, a higher semi-elasticity of about - 3.38 is estimated
when considering only affiliates without a loss carryforward.
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6 Conclusion
By using the presented investigational approach, which focuses directly on balance sheet
items reflecting intrafirm sales, it can be confirmed that transfer pricing of intrafirm sales
represents a relevant channel to shift profits. The regression results clearly confirm the
expected impact of the tax rate on the size of ‘accounts receivable from affiliated compa-
nies’, as well as on ‘accounts receivable from parent company’, and thus on intrafirm sales.
When interpreting the empirical results, it should be emphasized that it is not possible
to identify the magnitude of the transfer pricing effect against the quantity effect. How-
ever, the estimated response of ‘accounts receivable from affiliated companies’ indicates
that tax optimal transfer pricing is possible. That means shifting works effectively despite
anti-avoidance legislations and tax audits based on the arm’s length principle. Thus, the
results suggest that multinationals can evade taxation in high tax countries for the benefit
of locations offering lower tax rates.
Cosidering for example column (5) in table 3, the estimated total semi-elasticity of intrafirm
sales with regard to a smaller tax rate at the supplying affiliate is - 3.38. This suggests
that the transfer price response with regard to an one percentage point smaller tax rate
might be more than one. Thus, reducing statutory tax rate differences seems to remain a
promising strategy for countries trying to attract tax bases. Nevertheless, be aware that
these can only be rough estimates, since it is impossible to identify the magnitude of the
transfer pricing effect against the quantity effect, which in turn does not constitute a direct
effect on taxable profits. Only the response of the transfer price with regard to the tax rate
constitutes directly an equal effect on reported taxable profits at the respective affiliate.
However, the results are quite similar in comparison to results of previous studies based
on US data.
For companies, the tax impact on transfer prices is related with distortions due to ineffi-
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ciencies from misleading decentralized coordination. Furthermore, from a theoretical point
of view, the evidence on cross-country profit shifting activities suggests that multination-
als have enhanced opportunities compared to purely national firms. Nevertheless, further
empirical research seems to be useful to analyse the effects of profit shifting opportunities
on companies’ investment decisions. Finally, the provided evidence on transfer pricing of
intrafirm sales as one relevant channel of profit shifting might be useful for further research
considering the European tax competition process.
Datasources and Definitions
Firm-level data are taken from theMiDi dataset of the Bundesbank, see Lipponer (2006)
for an overview.
Distance is taken from ”http://www.etn.nl/distance.htm”. It contains flight distance in
km.
GDP in US dollars, nominal, taken from OECD Economic Outlook (2005) 77.
Lending Rate is the lending rate for loans to the private sector, taken from the IMF
International Financial Yearbook (2005), augmented with corresponding ECB figures, that
are taken from “http://www.ecb.int/stats/pdf/money/interest/rir nrir.pdf”.
Statutory tax rates are taken from the IBFD databases and from tax surveys provided
by the tax advisory companies Ernst&Young, PwC and KPMG.
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Appendix
Alternative Specifications
Table 5: Transfer Pricing of Intrafirm Sales
Dependent Variable Natural log of accounts receivable from affiliates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
STRF -1.31∗∗ -2.01∗∗ -1.86∗∗ -2.21∗∗ -3.16∗∗
(.490) (.470) (.521) (.691) (.678)
ln(TURNOVER) .514∗∗ .492∗∗ .549∗∗ .507∗∗ .511∗∗
(.125) (.118) (.117) (.124) (.110)
ln(LENDING RATE) -.657∗∗ -.592∗∗ -.628∗∗ -.662∗∗ -.571∗∗
(.090) (.080) (.087) (.090) (.077)
STRFxDFIN 1.93∗∗ 2.05∗∗
(.464) (.475)
DFIN .286 .228
(.165) (.168)
STRFxDLCF 2.08∗∗ 2.16∗∗
(.506) (.494)
DLCF -.924∗∗ -.916∗∗
(.175) (.171)
STRFxDWO 1.12 .746
(.595) (.564)
DWO -.329 -.161
(.225) (.214)
R2 .095 .144 .099 .095 .148
All regressions are IV estimations. At the first stage ln(TURNOVER) is regressed on all exoge-
nous variables and ln(GDP). Only second stage regression results are presented. F-tests of the
significance of the first stage specifications are all significant at 1% level. Standard errors are in
parentheses, which are clustered within 224 year-country cells and robust against random firm-
specific and country effects using the Huber-White sandwich formula. A star denotes significance
at the 5% level and two stars at the 1% level. All estimates include a full set of 2,565 firm, 46
industry and time fixed effects. There are 26,786 observations.
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Table 6: Transfer Pricing of Intrafirm Sales with Parent Company
Dependent Variable Natural log of accounts receivable from German parent
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
STRGE-STRF 1.50∗ 1.37∗∗ 2.22∗∗ -.854 -.385
(.593) (.572) (.639) (1.11) (1.05)
ln(TURNOVER) .831∗∗ .820∗∗ .856∗∗ .820∗∗ .836∗∗
(.135) (.141) (.129) (.134) (.135)
ln(LENDING RATE) -.422∗∗ -.415∗∗ -.395∗∗ -.409∗∗ -.375∗∗
(.087) (.084) (.084) (.087) (.082)
ln(DISTANCE) -.194∗∗ -.191∗∗ -.189∗∗ -.193∗∗ -.185∗∗
(.029) (.029) (.028) (.028) (.028)
(STRGE-STRF )xDFIN .574 .425
(.774) (.764)
DFIN .057 .049
(.116) (.112)
(STRGE-STRF )xDLCF -2.81∗∗ -2.83∗∗
(.707) (.726)
DLCF .022 -.023
(.071) (.079)
(STRGE-STRF )xDWO 2.60∗ 2.77∗
(1.12) (1.10)
DWO -.009 -.014
(.103) (.102)
R2 .081 .090 .087 .082 .095
All regressions are IV estimations. At the first stage ln(TURNOVER) is regressed on all exoge-
nous variables and ln(GDP). Only second stage regression results are presented. F-tests of the
significance of the first stage specifications are all significant at 1% level. Standard errors are in
parentheses, which are clustered within 222 year-country cells and robust against random firm-
specific and country effects using the Huber-White sandwich formula. A star denotes significance
at the 5% level and two stars at the 1% level. All estimates include a full set of 1,383 firm, 46
industry and time fixed effects. There are 10,991 observations.
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